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Comments
EXTENT OF AUTHORITY OF AN AUToMoBmE SALESMAN TO EXCHANGE

This note deals primarily with the problem arising when an agent authorized
to sell an automobile for his principal is expressly instructed not to accept another
car in trade. In violation of his instructions he accepts from the vendee, as part
payment of the purchase price, a used ear. The problem presented has numerous
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aspects, two of which will be considered in some detail: first, that presented if
the agent has been intrusted with the possession of the car, with his power of
disposition limited as above; and second, that presented if the agent has similar
limited authority but does not have possession.
The question presented is primarily one of the agent's authority. We may
start with the proposition that one appointing an agent to act for him may invest
that agent with as much or as little of his legal personality as he sees fit, i. e.,
the agent's authority may be broad or narrow.1 We may note also at the outset
that the principal is bound by the acts of such agent only within the scope of the
authority thus granted.2 If these were the only considerations involved, the
answer to the question put would be simple indeed-the principal has not authorized the agent to take cars in trade and hence the principal is not bound by
such trades.
The concept of apparent authority, however, may, and often does, alter the
result reached. We will not argue the terminology involved, though it might well
be said that what is "apparent" to one is also "real" to him. It seems futile,
for instance, to argue whether the clouds visible in the sky are "apparent" or
"real." So with "apparent" authority. If a third party reasonably believes from
the principal's conduct that the agent has, in fact, the authority he purports to
possess, such authority would seem to be "real" to such third person and, being
"real," worthy of reliance, and acts done in conformity therewith would seem
to be binding upon the principal. Such is, in fact, the case. When in a given
situation a court holds that an agent has "apparent" authority to bind his
principal, the contract is as binding on the principal as it would have been had the
principal given the agent express or "real" authority.3 On our facts, since the
agent has no express authority to accept trades, and it would seem difficult to
"imply" such authority in the face of express orders to the contrary, our inquiry
seems to center around the concept of apparent authority. Broadly put, our
first question is this: What is the extent of the apparent authority vested in an
agent by reason of his principal's grant to him of the possession of a chattel
with a limited power of disposal thereof?
The answer depends largely upon the character of the agent. It has been well
established in our common law from early times that the mere intrusting of
possession of a chattel to another did not invest that other with any authority,
real or apparent, to dispose of the chattel in any way.4 Possession was a neutral
circumstance. It might mean anything in general, and actually meant nothing

1. 1 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 709.
2. 2 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1709.
3. Boylan v. Workman, 206 Ia. 469, 220 N. W. 49 (1928) ; Daly Lumber Co.
v. Brunswick-Walke-Collender Co., 263 N. W. 234 (Iowa 1934); Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. Waugh, 222 Ky. 198, 300 S. W. 592 (1927); National Deposit
Bank v. Ohio Coal Co., 250 Ky. 288, 62 S. W. (2d) 1048 (1933).
4. Young v. Harris-Cortuer Co., 152 Tenn. 15, 268 S. W. 125 (1924);
Collins v. Rulli, 20 Hun 246 (N. Y. 1880); Romeo v. Martucci, 72 Conn. 504, 45
Atl. 1 (1899) ; Drain v. LaGrange State Bank, 303 Ill. 330, 135 N. E. 780 (1922) ;
Moe Co. v. Logue Co., 108 Ill. App. 128 (1903). 1 WILISTON, SALES (1924) § 313;
VoL, SALES (1931) 398.
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in particular. If, however, possession were intrusted to an agent who was himself
a selling agent for similar commodities,5 or a dealer in like articles, the same
result did not inevitably follow. It has been the feeling of a substantial number
of courts that one in possession of an article who was a dealer in similar articles
was "apparently" authorized to sell it.7 This result has been reached on the
theory, among others, that although naked possession confers no apparent authority to deal with the article, if other indicia of authority be added to bare
possession, apparent authority to deal with the article may follow. The fact that
the possessor-agent is a dealer in similar articles is a circumstance, it is said,
indicating that such possessor may have received authority from the owner to
sell.

8

There is, however, another line of authority taking the opposite positionO
The agent, it is said, had no express authority to sell. Possession, moreover,
means nothing2o It inevitably follows that there was no apparent authority to
sell.11 We might suggest that the difference between the two views lies in the
different feelings of the courts involved as to the relative equities of the defrauded
owner and the purchaser. To one group of courts the owner has helped create a
situation rife with potentialities for fraud, and for his misplaced confidence in
the alter ego of his choice he must suffer. To the other group of courts the purchaser is a somewhat gullible adventurer for whose welfare the owner was no
insurer. He should have known that possession meant nothing, and yet he made
no inquiry as to the dealer's authority. Consequently, the fault is his, and his
the burden.
But it is not the agent's power to sell that is denied in the automobile cases.
The owner freely admits the agent's power to dispose of the chattel by sale.

5. Pickering v. Busk, 15 East 38 (K. B. 1812); Cable Co. v. Hunt, 8 Ga.
App. 562, 70 S. E. 70 (1911); Ex parte Dixon, 4 Ch. D. 133 (1876).
6. Carter v. Rowley, 59 Cal. App. 486, 211 Pac. 267 (1922); Moore v.
Ellison, 82 Colo. 478, 261 Pac. 461 (1927); Commercial Acceptance Trust Co. v.
Bailey, 87 Cal. App. 117, 261 Pac. 743 (1927); Glass v. Continental Guaranty
Corp., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876 (1921); Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Schutt,
97 N. J. Law 225, 116 Atl. 722 (1922); Clark v. Flynn, 120 Misc. 474, 199
N. Y. Supp. 583 (1923); Jones v. Commercial Inv. Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 Pac.
896 (1924); Harrison v. Auto Securities Co., 70 Utah 11, 257 Pac. 677 (1927).
7. See note 6, supra.
8. Ibid.
9. Biggs v. Evans, [1893] 1 Q. B. 88; Utica Trust & Deposit Co. v. Decker,
244 N. Y. 340, 155 N. E. 665 (1927); Silberfeld v. Solomon, 70 Colo. 413, 202
Pgc. 113 (1920); Parsons v. Webb, 8 Me. 38 (1831); Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305
(1882); Warner v. Martin, 11 How. 209 (U. S.1850).
The Restatement of Agency under § 175, seemingly, has adopted a compromise
position between the two views noted. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 175. See
(1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 117, 120. The Restatement of Agency states the principle
to be that: "(1) A disclosed or partially disclosed principal who entrusts a
special agent with the possession of a chattel other than a commercial document
. . . with directions to deal with it in a particular way, as by sale, barter,
pledge, or mortgage, is not thereby affected in his interests by a transaction of a
kind different from that authorized. (2) The principal is affected in his interests by a transaction of the same kind as that authorized if it is conducted in
the usual course of business by an agent dealing in such chattels with one who
reasonably believes that the agent is authorized."
10. See note 4, supra.
11. See note 9, supra.
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What he denies is the agent's power to dispose of it by barter or exchange. The
bearing upon this issue of the agent's power to sell, discussed heretofore, seems,
however, to be this: if the agent, from his possession as a dealer, has the appearance of ownership, it would seem to follow that he also has the full range of an
owner's powers, which would, of course, include the power to barter or exchange as
well as to sell for cash.12
If, however, the circumstances were such that the possessor of the car remained merely an agent, and was not apparently a dealer (the typical car salesman case), the owner of the car being either the salesman's employer or a private
party, it remains to consider his position apart from any usage as to trade-ins.
The agent, upon this hypothesis, is concededly an agent for the purpose of sale,
but he is merely that and nothing more. Such being the case, the orthodox dogma
is that he can sell only for cash.13 His apparent authority goes no further than
4
the acceptance of money for the sale.1 This principle was enunciated as the
logical result of a long line of precedent that a special agent for the purposes of
5
sale did not have the authority to barter or exchange.'
a
reasonable construction and
upon
part
in
large
based
This doctrine was
agent had no express authe
Certainly
interpretation of the agent's authority.
has implied auconcededly
thority to barter or exchange. Although an agent
to the
incidental
thority to do those acts which are reasonably necessary and
a
express authority granted, a sale of goods can be accomplished without barter
or exchange. Nor was this a power that the agent must be given in order to
0
effectuate the principal's grant of authority.' As to apparent authority, the
principal has not, by merely creating an agency for sale, held out the agent as
an owner, nor does the authority of the agent reasonably appear to be greater
than that of a mere selling agent. A prudent third party, conversant with
the usages of the business world, knows or is held to know, that a selling agent
cannot deal with the owner's goods as he wishes. He can sell and only sell, which
means "to dispose of for cash."' 7 To permit the agent to barter or exchange would
give the agent a dominion over the goods far in excess of his real or apparent
authority, a dominion that only an owner, or one who reasonably appears to be

12. See the remarks of Professor Mechem in (1928) 22 IIn. L. REv. 652.
13. Holmes v. Tyner, 179 S. W. 887 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Davison v.
Parks, 79 N. H. 262, 108 Atl. 288 (1919); Royle v. Worcester Buick Co., 243
Mass. 143, 137 N. E. 531 (1922) semble. In the following cases from the stated
facts it cannot be determined whether the agent was possessed of the principal's
chattel. Eaton v. Hattiesburg Auto Sales Co., 151 Miss. 211, 117 So. 534 (1928);
Reo Motor Car Co. v. Barnes, 9 S. W. (2d) 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), (1929)
42 HARv. L. REv. 570; Lee v. Dixie Motor Sales Co., 155 Miss. 393, 124 So. 487
(1929); cf. Salley v. Jones Motor Co., 12 La. App. 150, 125 So. 599 (1929).
14. See note 13, supra.
15. Kearns v. Nickse, 80 Conn. 23, 66 AtI. 779 (1907); Victor Sewing
Machine Co. v. Heller, 44 Wis. 265 (1878); Guerreiro v. Peile, 3 Barn. & Ad.
616 (1820); Brown v. Smith, 67 N. C. 245 (1872); Taylor & Farley Organ Co. v.
Starkey, 59 N. H. 142 (1879); Trudo v. Anderson, 10 Mich. 357 (1862); Jones
v. Richards, 50 Misc. 645, 98 N. Y. Supp. 698 (1906); Roberts v. Francis, 123
Wis. 78, 100 N. W. 1076 (1904); Cleveland v. State Bank of Ohio, 16 Ohio St.
236 (1865) ; Liebhardt v. Wilson, 38 Colo. 1, 88 Pac. 173 (1906).
16. See note 15, supra.
17. 2 C. J. § 234, p. 599.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss3/3

4

et al.: Comments

MISSOUBI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

in the position of an owner, would have. It seems clear that there is here, as in
other analagous situations, a well defined policy to discourage the casual transfer
of "ownership."
Following the long line of precedent established in the earlier barter cases, the
doctrine has been extended to automobile exchange transactions,18 as to which
it has been accorded considerable acceptance by American courts. It should be
noted, however, that its application to automobile exchange transactions has been
confined, so far as the writer's research has determined, exclusively to cases in
which the authority of a mere salesman to deal in this manner was contested.
We have found no cases in which a salesman in fact reasonably appeared to be
the owner of the car he was attempting to sell.
An additional large class of cases is that class wherein an agent, who has
been authorized to make contracts in regard to the sale or disposition of the principal's chattel, has not been given possession of the chattel. Again the agent, in
violation of his instructions, purports to barter or exchange the chattel rather
than to dispose of it by sale. Express authority to do so is lacking, and similarly
implied authority. As to apparent authority, whatever slender indication of authority might arise from possession is here lacking, and on these facts alone,
other indicia of title being absent, courts will not recognize any greater authority
in such an agent than that expressly granted by his principal.19 The authority
to barter is not, by hypothesis, included with the authority expressly granted.
The prevailing view of the American courts is expressed in the Restatement of
Agency to be:
"Unless otherwise agreed, authority to sell includes only authority to sell
for money payable at the time of the transfer of the title.20 (italics mine)
Comment (a)to above: "Unless otherwise agreed, authority to sell does
not include authority to mortgage the subject matter, to exchange it, to
make a gift of it, to grant an option of purchase, or to partition it."
Upon the reasoning indicated herein, which is supported by ample authority,
it would seem clear that an automobile sales agent without possession of the
chattel would be no more favored than any other agent similarly situated.
We conclude, then, that possession alone, save in those jurisdictions following the "dealer" exception, and a fortiori a mere grant of express power to sell,

18. See note 13, supra. In an effort to alleviate the hardship upon third
persons who dealt with a factor in the belief that he was the true owner (Bronson,
J., in Stevens v. Wilson, 6 Hill 512 (N. Y. 1844)) some states have passed the
so.called Factors' Acts. The effect of those statutes upon the instant problem is
outside the scope of this note as the effect given the statutes depends in each
case upon the language of the particular statute and the construction which the
courts in the jurisdiction involved have placed upon that statute. However a
query may be raised as to whether or not an agent who has possession of a
demonstrator (which may be accepted and treated by the parties as a facsimile of
the automobile to be sold) can be considered for the purpose of the Factors' Acts
as in "possession" of the automobile actually sold. That car may in fact be in the
principal's warehouse or still in the manufacturer's assembly line. 1 WILLISTON,
SALES (1924) §§ 318-323; VoLw, SALES (1931) 402; (1921) 14 A. L. R. 431.
19. Elfring v. New Birdsall Co., 16 S. D. 252, 92 N. W. 29 (1902); Fay &
Eagan Co. v. Causey, 131 N. C. 350, 42 S. E. 827 (1902); Hayes v. Colby, 65 N. H.
192, 18 Atl. 251 (1889); Sioux City Nursery & Seed Co. v. Magnes, 5 Colo. App.
172, 38 Pac. 330 (1894).

20.

RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933)

§ 65.
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conveys no "apparent" authority to the agent to deal with the car other than in
accordance with his instructions, which do not include barter or exchange.
Our next consideration concerns the effect of a trade usage of exchange upon
the authority of the agent. In the ordinary contract relationship, if the parties,
having knowledge of the existence of a usage in a particular business, manifest
their assent to be bound by such usage, the contract will be so interpreted, 2 '
22
and their manifestation of such assent may be implied as well as expressed.
Whenever a usage in a particular business has become so well known, so notorious,
that any reasonably prudent person in such business would have known of its
existence, parties dealing in the business will be charged with knowledge of the
usage.28 Similarly, a principal acting through an agent is bound by the proper
usages of the business concerning which the agent is instructed to act. 24 The
principal is presumed to have conferred authority upon the agent in contemplation
of the trade usage. Although the effect of a trade usage, once established, upon
an agent's authority is clear, the proof of the existence of a usage so well-known
and notorious that the principal may be held to have manifested his consent with
reference to it may and often does raise a difficult problem of proof, particularly
in view of the fact that it must be shown that the usage included relates not only
to the performance of the act in question but by the particular agent involved.
Specifically where the authority of an automobile salesman has allegedly arisen
from the effect of a trade usage upon the express grant of power, the proof of
the usage, if attempted, has been, apparently, an almost insurmountable obstacle.
In this situation, while the courts repeat that:
"A salesman's authority to sell automobiles for the owner does not
confer on him authority to exchange them for other automobiles, in the
absence of proof of special authority 8o to do or a general custom or
usage from which such special authority can be inferred,"25 (italics mine)
we have found no case wherein the court has been convinced by the evidence
introduced, if any, that such a usage did exist.2 6 At the other extreme, in one
of the leading cases in this field the court took judicial knowledge of the existence
of such a usage. This was the case of Voell v. Klein,27 in which the court said:

21. See Weisberg v. Hunt, 239 Mass. 190, 131 N. E. 471 (1921) ; Walters v.
Albee, 245 Mass. 216, 139 N. E. 521 (1923); Shuman v. Goldsmith, 115 Misc. 327,
188 N. Y. Supp. 84 (1921).
22. Neer v. Lang, 252 Fed. 575 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918). See Pfiester v. Western
U. Tel. Co., 282 Ill. 69, 118 N. E. 407 (1917); Goben v. Akin, 208 Ia. 1354, 227
N. W. 400 (1929); Long Bros. v. Armsby Co., 43 Mo. App. 253 (1891); Stephens
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 200 Wis. 181, 227 N. W. 875 (1929).
23. Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160 (1924) ; Continental Coal
Co. v. Birdsall, 108 Fed. 882 (C. C. A. 4th, 1901); Central Commercial Co. v.
Jones-Dusenbury Co., 251 Fed. 13 (C. C. A. 7th, 1918).
24. Watts v. Howard, 70 Minn. 122, 72 N. W. 840 (1897) ; Westurn v. Page,
94 Wis. 251, 68 N. W. 1003 (1896); Milwaukee & Wyo. Inv. Co. v. Johnston, 35
Neb. 554, 53 N. W. 475 (1892) ; Durkee v. Carr, 38 Ore. 189, 63 Pac. 117 (1900) ;
Adams v. Pittsburgh Ins. Co., 95 Pa. St. 348 (1880) ; Williams v. Getty, 31 Pa. St.
461 (1858) ; Larson v. Aultman & Taylor Co., 86 Wis. 281, 36 N. W. 915 (1893) ;
American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanathan, 11 Kan. 400 (1873); Brady v. Todd, 9
C. B. N. S. 592 (1861).
25. Lee v. Dixie Motor Sales, 155 Miss. 393, 124 So. 487, 488 (1929).
26. See note 13, supra.
27. 184 Wis. 620, 623, 200 N. W. 364 (1924), (1925) 10 IOwA L. BULL. 144,
(1925) 3 Wis. L. REv. 190.
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it is a matter of common knowledge that in the sale of automobiles at
the present time an old car is frequently, if not usually, accepted as part payment
28
.," and in the subsequent case of Reader v. Applegate, the Wisconsin court
by dictum reiterated this position. Although the position of the Wisconsin court
in 1924, the date of the Voell decision, might have aroused valid criticism at the
time,20 there seems considerable justification for it today. At the present time
it is a well established fact that a large percentage of automobile sales involve
an exchange transaction. To the layman it is a "customary" feature of the
automobile sales transaction.30 In fact, from statistics compiled by the Association of Sales Finance Companies, the percentage of trade-ins on the sale of new
cars increased from 73 per cent in 1929 to 88 per cent in 1938. The percentage
of trade-ins on the sales of used cars for the same period increased from 46 to 59
per cent.3 1 Although it cannot be determined how many of these sales were consummated by agents with or without authority to make exchanges, 3 2 these facts
seem to indicate that there does exist in the automobile business generally over
the United States a usage to take in barter or exchange a used car at the time
of the sale of a new car. However, whether the particular usage exists in a given
locality or not, or with regard to agents of the particular type involved, are
questions of fact to be determined in each particular case.
Missouri has voiced its approval of the doctrine, previously noted, that an
agent who is authorized to sell his principal's personalty does not have authority
to barter or exchange that propertySS So much is settled. The applicability of
the doctrine to the automobile cases in this state, however, involving as it does
the problem of the possible trade usage, remains a matter of conjecture. It is
not inconceivable that the automobile cases may be distinguished from the orthodox

28. 224 Wis. 574, 271 N. W. 839 (1937), (1937) 21 MARQ. L. Ruv. 148.
29. See Comment (1925) 10 IowA L. BULL. 144.
30. In a nationwide broadcast by Mr. W. J. Cameron of the Ford Motor Co.
on March 6, 1938, he described certain features of the "used car problem," and
in his concluding remarks stated in part that the trade-in had "become customary"
in the American automobile business. (italics mine)
31.
1929 1932 1933 1935 1936 1937 1938
Percent Trade-ins.
85
84
88
89
86
85
On sales of new cars ..........(a) 73
55
59
52
55
51
48
On sales of used cars ........ (a) 46
151
162
216
209
162
140
new
....
(b)
Used cars sold, 9 of
(b)
Source:
Automobile
(a) Source: Association of Sales Finance Companies;
Manufacturer's Association. The figures after 1938 were not available to this
writer.
32. Thus in Salley v. Jones Motor Co., 12 La. App. 150, 125 So. 599 (1929),
the court concedes the .proof of usage to take trade-ins but not as to the
particular salesman involved.
33. In Benny v. Rhodes, 18 Mo. 147 (1853), the principal consigned goods
to an agent for the purpose of sale. A third party who dealt with the agent
was fully aware that the agent was acting in the capacity of a factor. The
contract for the sale of the goods provided that payment was to be made by
cancelling an antecedent debt owed by the agent to the third party. The court
held that ". . . in the absence of special instructions, the agent was authorized
to sell according to the usual mode of dealing in the particular trade with which
he was conducting. If the consignee sells in an unusual manner, not warranted
by the custom of the trade, and without express authority, the principal is not
bound by his act. An agent for sale cannot barter the goods of his principal."
Accord: Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Givan, 65 Mo. 89 (1877).
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barter cases on the ground of a usage in the business that the selling agent
may accept used cars in trade as a part of the normal sales transaction.
SIMON POLSKY

INSURANCE-AUTomATIC PREMIUM LOAN POLIcIES AND THE NoN-FoRpTuRE
STATUTES

Missouri, as most states, has a statute designed to prevent the forfeiture,
for non-payment of premiums, of life insurance policies which have accumulated
a reserve.' Begot by a widespread distrust and a knowledge of unjust practices
of the increasingly affluent insurance companies, and nurtured by courts indulgent
of the policy holders, the non-forfeiture statutes have enjoyed a history of strict
construction against the companies. However, in a recent decision, Heuring V.
Central States Life Ins. Co., 2 the Missouri Court of Appeals at Springfield went
to lengths to hold for a beneficiary to which it is doubtful whether many courts
would go.
The question in the Heuring case was whether an automatic premium loan
provision was void because it conflicted with the non-forfeiture statutes. Briefly,
the statutes provide that no life insurance policy on which premiums have been
paid for three years shall be forfeited by reason of non-payment of premiums
but, instead, the reserve shall be used to purchase extended insurance.$ The automatic premium loan clause in the policy was of the usual kind and provided that
if the insured so requested in his application, or later, any premium still unpaid
on the last day of grace would be advanced by the company as a loan against the
reserve.4 The insured had requested the automatic loan privilege in her application and when she did not pay her premium it was paid by the company in pursuance thereto. The reserve was sufficient to keep the policy in force in this
manner for a little more than ten months, but if it had been applied to purchase
temporary (extended) insurance under the statute the temporary insurance
would have been in force for twelve months and twenty-two days. It so happened
that the insured died in twelve months and ten days. The first trial resulted in a
judgment for the insurance company, 5 the court holding the insured could enter
into any contract he wished and would be bound thereby. The statutes were not
considered. On certiorarithe Supreme Court of Missouri 6 found the decision to
conflict with its own prior decisions to the effect that there was no such freedom

1. MO. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 5741-5744.
2. 232 Mo. App. 731, 120 S.W. (2d) 176 (1938).
3. Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1929) § 5741. The following sections contain provisions
relieving a policy from the application of the statute if certain other methods of
settlement upon lapse were prescribed in the policy contract. The automatic
premium loan provision clearly was not, and was not contended to be, within the
exceptions, and so they will not be discussed here.
4. See note 2, supra, 179.
5. Heuring v. Central States Life Ins. Co., 230 Mo. App. 42, 87 S. W. (2d)
661, 668 (1935).
6. State ex rel. Heuring v. Allen, 342 Mo. 81, 112 S. W. (2d) 843 (1938).
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to contract within the field occupied by the non-forfeiture laws. The case was
reversed and remanded, but the question of whether the statutes were violated
was left expressly up to the court of appeals. Upon a second trial the beneficiary
was allowed to recover, the court holding that the statute nullified the automatic
loan clause and that the reserve should have been used to extend the insurancev
Since a great many Missouri insurance contracts contain a similar automatic
premium loan provision, by which their premiums have, at one time or another,
been paid, this decision, challenging the provision, has caused the life insurance
companies no little concern. Logically it would seem that all such policie3 are no
longer in force in their original form but have lapsed and now exist, if at all,
only by force of the statute, and in the form prescribed therein. The matter
could become more acute where the insured has resumed payment of premiums
in cash after one premium has been paid by automatic loan. It is likely that
the acceptance, on the company's part, and the payment, on the insured's part,
of further premiums in cash would estop either party to deny the vitality of the
original policy contract. At any rate it is doubtful whether the courts would
extend the ruling of the Heuring case to such dryly logical extreme. Any safe
conclusion in this respect must await further decisions.
For the present it is of interest to examine the final decision of the
Springfield Court. It is well-settled that the non-forfeiture statutes are constitutional,8 that they apply to all Missouri old-line insurance contracts, 9 and
that they are mandatory, overriding all antagonistic policy provisions. 0 Conceding
that the policy provision was doomed once it was found to conflict with the statute,
the question is,-was there a conflict? The court answered in the affirmative,
saying that upon "default .
. the reserve . . . shall be applied as a
net single premium for extended insurance . . . that such action is made
mandatory
.
that as the special automatic loan privilege clause provides
a method . .
not contemplated in section 5741 . . . it is void.""1 (italics
the writer's). This reasoning recognizes that the statute contemplates default,
that is, non-payment of prbmiums, and operates only as a consequence of a default,

7. See note 2, supra.
8. Dodge v. New York Life Ins. Co., 189 S. W. 609 (Mo. App. 1916), rvt'd,
246 U. S. 357 (1918) ; Burridge v. New York Life Ins. Co., 211 Mo. 158, 109 S.W.
560 (1908); Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U. S. 489 (1907); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389 (1900); Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246 (1906); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28
(1900) ; Daggsv. Orient Ins. Co., 136 Mo. 382 (1896), aff'd, 172 U. S. 557 (1898);
State es nf. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 194 Mo. 124, 91 5. W. 1062 (1906); Paul
v.
Virginia,
8 Wall.
168 (U. S.155
1868)
Stone, 11 Mo. 388, 24 S.W. 104
(1893)
; Hooper
v. California,
U. ;5.State
648 v.
(1894).'
9. Smith v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 173 Mo. 329, 72 S.W. 935 (1903);
Horton v. New York Life Ins. Co., 151 Mo. 604, 52 S. W. 356 (1899); Whittaker
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 133 Mo. App. 664, 114 S. W. 53 (1908); Cravens v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 148 Mo. 583, 50 S. W. 519 (1899), aff'd, 178 U. S.389 (1900).
Cf. Smoot v. Bankers Life Ass'n, 138 Mo. App. 438, 120 S.W. 719 (1909) (the
statute does not apply to assessment compames); Garretson v. Sovereign Camp,
W. 0. W., 210 Mo. App. 539, 647, 243 S.W. 257 (1922) (statute does not apply
to fraternal beneficiary associations).
10. McKinney v. Fidelity Mutual Ins. Co., 270 Mo. 305,193 S.W. 564 (1917);
Saunders v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 212 Mo. App. 186, 253 S.W. 177 (1923).
11. See note 2, supra, 182.
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and, a fortiori, that until default calls it into play the statute cannot conflict with
anything in the policy. It has been urged that an automatic premium loan clause,
instead of following a default, actually prevents it; that by requesting that all
premiums unpaid on the last day of grace be paid from the loan value the insured
has chosen not to allow a default. 12 So found the Michigan Supreme Court 13 in a
case where a similar statute and policy provision were held not to conflict. Called
upon to determine the effect of an automatic premium loan, the Kansas City Court
of Appeals'14 adopted the Michigan opinion, adding that, "The situation would
have been no different than if he had paid the assessments out of his own pocket
or had he borrowed the money from a bank or a friend."'15 True, the latter case
did not involve the non-forfeiture statute,' 6 but the presence in the case of the
statute should not necessarily lend a different meaning to "default." In fact, on
the reasoning of the Michigan court, the statute is not properly in the case until
the naked non-payment question has been decided, and on this precise point the
holdings of the two Missouri courts of appeals are contrary. It is submitted that
a promisor is not in default when the debt has been paid by his direction out of
funds subject to his order, even though such funds are in the hands of the
obligee. In effect this is no different from where the insured signs a premium
lien note in payment of a premium, and it is well-settled in Missouri that there
is no default in the latter instance.17
The court in the Heuring case explained away the holding of the Michigan
court with the terse statement that the Michigan act was different. However,
that act, while worded differently, seems to attain the same general object, namely,

12. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance, 151 Mich. 610,
115 N. W. 707 (1908); Barthel v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 230 Mo. App. 247,
93 S.W. (2d) 285 (1936) ; Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 44 F. (2d)
540 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930); Spratling v. International Life Ins. Co., 23 Ga. App. 609,
99 S. E. 162 (1919) ; Perkins v. Empire Life Ins. Co., 17 Ga. App. 658, 87 S. E. 1094
(1916); Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Ross, 185 Ark. 556, 48 S. W. (2d)
230 (1932); Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Easley, 188 Ark. 1012, 69 S.W. (2d)
273 (1934). In most of these eases the automatic loan provision was not examined
in connection with a non-forfeiture law, and so, although the opinions are relevant
to the question in the Heuring case, they are not strictly in point.
13. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance, 151 Mich.
610, 115 N. W. 707 (1908).
14. Barthel v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 230 Mo. App. 247, 93 S. W. (2d)
285 (1936).
15. Id. at 290.
16. The case involved an assessment company, to which the non-forfeiture
law does not apply. The question was whether the payment of premiums under
the automatic loan provision continued the policy in full force so that the loan
value would increase each year just as though premiums had been paid in cash.
It was held such payment of premiums did not change the status of the policy
and that the increased loan values of each subsequent year were available to
the insured. It is interesting to note that giving efficacy to the automatic loan
clause was in favor of the insured, while in the Heuring case it was to the insured's advantage to deny the validity of the clause.
17. McCall v. International Life Ins. Co., 196 Mo. App. 318, 193 S.W. 860
(1917); Rick v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 230 Mo. App. 1084, 93 S.W.
(2d) 1126 (1936); McGinnis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 78 S. W. (2d) 501 (Mo. App.
1934); Insurance Co. v. Dutcher, 95 U. S.269, 272 (1877) (court said that payment by note was the same as paying in cash, the only difference being that it
lacked the formality of money changing hands, and that the law does not require
an idle thing to be done).
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to prescribe that every insurance policy, "in event of default, shall secure to
the owner a stipulated form of insurance, the net value of which shall be at least
equal to the reserve at date of default."' 8 This is a mandatory consequence of
default. It is quite different from the automatic premium loan agreement, and
conflict was avoided only because the Michigan court found there was no default.
The summary dismissal of the Michigan case, without pointing to the controlling
difference in the statute, is not convincing.
It may be argued with reason that the terms "default" or "non-payment of
premiums" are not words of a single inevitable connotation, but are ambiguous
and subject to construction. Indeed, this is suggested by both the Michigan
Supreme Court and the Kansas City Court of Appeals.19 However, there is nothing
in its opinion to indicate the Springfield Court found default by construction of
the act. On the contrary, default is assumed. It is at best debatable whether
even so gymnastic a process as construction would lead to the conclusion that
there was non-payment of premiums within the meaning of the statute. In its
search for the meaning of ambiguous words in the non-forfeiture law the courts
are guided mainly by two inquiries: (1) What was the intended meaning as
ascertainable from the purpose of the act,20 and (2) what interpretation will favor
the insured? 21 The obvious purpose of the law was to prevent the insurance
companies from avoiding policies for non-payment of premiums and confiscating
the reserves belonging by right to the insured. Since under the automatic loan
provision the insured gets the benefit of the reserve it does not seem that the
general purpose of the act is being violated. Nor would the second inquiry compel
the finding of non-payment. Undoubtedly so finding in the instant case favored
the particular beneficiary, but whether the holding would be tothe advantage of
policy holders generally is doubtful. There are instances where the operation
of the automatic loan would be a definite advantage; for example, where the
insured is temporarily embarrassed but wishes to keep his insurance in full force
in its original form until such time as he is able to resume payments. Under the
extended insurance provision the reserve is applied as a single premium to purchase term insurance in the amount of the face of the policy. If the insured lives
beyond the term for which the insurance will be extended he is without insurance,
and to get more he would have to take out a new policy at a rate higher in
proportion to his increased age. Furthermore, the policy holder may have
become unable to pass the medical examination necessary in order to qualify

18. MIcH. CoMP. LAws (1929) § 12427(8).
19. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance, 151 Mich.
610, 115 N. W. 707 (1908); Barthel v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 230 Mo. Ap?.
247, 93 S.W. (2d) 285 (1936) (it was there said, "there was default on insured a
part in the sense that insured failed to continue to pay his assessments in the
ordinary way but there was no default in the sense that the policy was ended
by the non-action of the insured in this respect".)
20. Westerman v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias, 196 Mo. 670, 710, 714,
94 S. W. 470 (1906).
21. Gooch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 333 Mo. 191, 61 S. W. (2d) 704
(1933); Howell v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 215 Mo. App. 692, 253 S. W.
411 (1923), cert. denied, State ex rel. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 305
Mo. 607, 267 S.W. 379 (1924).
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for a standard risk policy. The only situation in which extended insurance
would clearly be to the insured's advantage is where he will die within the extended period, and that contingency is unpredictable. To be consistent with an
earlier opinion the Springfield court would concede the extended insurance provision is not necessarily the better plan for the insured. 22 So these two imposing
tenets of construction hardly support the result reached.
In summary, the Heuring case is certainly right if there was conflict. There
was conflict if automatically charging one's premium, on the last day of grace,
to the loan value by the company at the insured's request, made when the policy
was purchased, is "non-payment of premiums" within the meaning of the statute;
otherwise there was not. Non-payment, or default, may be a term of technical
significance, in which case the view that this was payment, although in a slightly
different manner, would seem logical. On the other hand, it may be an ambiguous
term that must be construed, in which case at least two devices of construction
point likewise to the conclusion that there was no default. How the court arrived
at default in the principal case is not clear, nor is lucidity added by the final statement in the opinion to the effect that the policy provision is void because it conflicts
with the statute, and a void provision cannot prevent a default. 23 If the court
had added, "and, there being a default, therefore there was a conflict," the circuity
of the proposition would have been complete. The court assumes there was the
necessary default and then reasons from that assumption to find default. It is
submitted that until there was a non-payment, calling the statute into the arena,
there could be no conflict nullifying the policy provision.
Possibly the real explanation of the holding lies beneath the legalistic
reasoning of the court and is founded on policy. It is well-settled that there
would not be "non-payment" if the insured requested the loan to pay his premiums
at the time the premiums became due. 24 The only feature distinguishing the principal case from such a procedure is the fact the request for the loan was made
at the time the policy was taken out, and so it must be this feature that is
objectionable. No court would condemn the farsightedness that would prompt
an insured to provide ahead against default. Could it be the court was thinking
that, as a matter of fact, the insured was not being farsighted; that the request
was the result, not of the insured's vision, but of high pressure salesmanship;
that when the insured failed to act when his premium became due he was actually
a defaulter, so far as he knew, and should be subject to the non-forfeiture
laws? That the court had this in mind is indicated by the meaning the
case imputes to non-payment, namely, the failure to do an affirmative act,
whether borrowing to pay or paying in cash, at the time the premium is due. Why
require an affirmative act "on the spot" if not to bring home to the policy holder
what he is doing? No other reason is apparent. In view of the historic solicitude
of the courts for policy holders and the suspicious resemblance of the automatic

22.
661, 668
23.
24.

Heuring v. Central States Life Ins. Co., 230 Mo. App. 42, 87 S.W. (2d)
(1935).
See note 2, supra, 183.
See note 17, supra.
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loan clause to a design to skirt the non-forfeiture laws, it is not unlikely this is
the real explanation for the holding. While this explanation would seem somewhat more understandable than the legalistic explanation in the opinion, it is
questionable whether such judicial paternalism is justifiable. Probably many
applicants for insurance are "taken in", but there are also many today who well
known what they are doing, and who should be allowed to purchase the plan
which would avoid default and its consequences if they prefer. It is doubtful
whether there is such widespread naivet6 among insurance purchasers as to
justify the holding of the principal case notwithstanding the policy of the law
to shelter insureds.
JESSE

D.

JAMES

VALIDITY OF SERvicE UPON SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE IN SuITs AGAINST

FoRtEIGN INSURANCE COMPANIES

A foreign insurance company may be sued in Missouri if the company comes
into the state and does business here, or if the company has consented to such
suit. The consent of the company may be express or may result from compliance with the provisions of the Missouri statute pertaining to such insurance
companies, which reads: "Any insurance company not incorporated by or
organized under the laws of this state, desiring to transact any business . . .
in this state, shall first file with the superintendent of the insurance department
a written instrument or power of attorney . . . appointing . . . said
. . . receive service of process . . . and upon whom
superintendent to
such process may be served for . . . such company, in all proceedings . . .
against such company, in any court of this state or in any court of the United
States in

this state.

. . . Service

of process

.

.

. issued

. . . as

aforesaid, upon the superintendent, shall be .
. deemed personal service
upon such company, so long as it shall have any policies or liabilities outstanding in this state, although such company may have withdrawn, been excluded
from or ceased to do business in this state . . "I
Under very similar statutes, it has been held that a foreign insurance company authorized to do business in the state is, for the purpose of venue, a resident
of each county in the state, and a service on the superintendent of insurance
in any county is good service regardless of the county in which the suit is
br6ught.2 It has been further held that if the superintendent is in a county
other than the one in which suit is brought, the court of the county where suit
is brought has implied power to issue process to the sheriff of the other county

1. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 5894. This statute is discussed by Bour, Recent
Missouri Decisions and The Restatement of the Conflict of Law8 (1938) 3 Mo.
L. Rav. 143, 148.
2. Curfman v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 167 Mo. App. 507, 152 S. W. 126
(1912); Renshaw v. Fidelity & De posit Co., 152 S. W. 129 (Mo. App. 1912);
Pittsburg Plate Glass v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. 152 S.W. 129 (Mo. App. 1912);
Meyer v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 184 Mo. 481, 83 S. W. 479 (1904).
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for service upon the defendant company, and process from any court of record
confers jurisdiction. 4 That this statute provides the only method by which
foreign insurance companies may be served with process is well settled by
Missouri decisions. 5 Such service is considered personal service on the corporation, and not mere constructive notice. 6 Being personal notice, slight errors
and mistakes in the returns are not so strictly regarded as they would be were
the service constructive. But the statute is by no means followed loosely and
it has been recently held that if the return failed to show that three copies of
process were left with the superintendent as required by statute,7 the court would
lack jurisdiction.8 This statute is a service statute concerning jurisdiction over
the person, and is not a venue statute,9 nor does the statute concern the suability
of the foreign insurance company, i. e., jurisdiction over the subject matter. 10
Furthermore, it only provides for service in suits against the foreign company
arising out of its insurance business and is not a good basis for service in purely
extraneous matters, such as contracts for sale of land."
The first Missouri case really to bring up for construction the Missouri
statute regarding service on foreign insurance was Gold Issue Mining & Milling
Co. v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co.j 2 Plaintiff was an Arizona corporation, while
defendant was a Pennsylvania company which was authorized to carry on business in Missouri and which had elected to come under Missouri's service statute.
The insured property was in Colorado. The property was destroyed, and service
was had upon the superintendent of insurance. Here, despite defendant's contention that the statute was only to apply to foreign insurance companies doing
business in this state and to suits founded upon contracts of insurance made in
this state, the court held that the foreign company was liable on the cause of

3. Stone v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 78 Mo. 655 (1883).
4. Fink v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 60 Mo. App. 673 (1895).
5. State ex rel. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Allen, 239 Mo. 189, 143 S. W.
500 (1911); State ex rel. General Accident Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 239 Mo. 195, 143
S. W. 500 (1911); State ex rel. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v.
Shields, 239 Mo. 190, 143 S. W. 500 (1911); State ex rel. Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Grimm, 239 Mo. 135, 143 S. W. 483 (1911) ; State ex rel. Casualty Co. of
America v. Muench, 239 Mo. 191, 143 S. W. 500 (1912); State ex rel. Employers'
Liability Assur. Corp. v. Fisher, 239 Mo. 192, 143 S. W. 501 (1912) ; State ex rel.
Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 239 Mo. 193, 143 S. W. 501 (1912);
State ex rel. Continental Casualty Co. v. Homer, 239 Mo. 194, 143 S. W. 501
(1912); Baile v. Equitable Fire Ins. Co., 68 Mo. 617 (1878).
6. Cox v. American Ins. Co., 137 Mo. App. 40, 119 S. W. 476 (1909).
7. Mo. Rv. STAT. (1929) § 5969.
8. State ex rel. Adler v. Ossing, 336 Mo. 386, 79 S. W. (2d) 255 (1934).
9. State ex rel. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Gantt, 274 Mo. 490, 203 S. W.
964 (1918).
10. State ex rel. Richardson v. Mueller, 230 Mo. App. 962, 90 S. W. (2d)
171 (1936).
11. State ex rel. Federal Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 88 S. W. (2d)
427 (Mo. App. 1935).
12. 267 Mo. 524, 184 S. W. 999 (1916). See also State ex rel. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Grimm, 239 Mo. 135, 143 S. W. 483 (1912), where it was
said that the terms of the statute were general, authorizing service of summons
in all suits against foreign insurance companies, and there was no reason to
qualify the statute by reading into it words limiting its application to cases
brought by resident plaintiffs or based upon contracts issued in Missouri.
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action which accrued in Colorado. The decision was based largely on the fact
that there was omitted from the existing statute the provisions inserted in the
early service statutes, which had stated that they were to apply only to causes
of action arising from contracts made in this state, and the resulting inference
that service on the superintendent for the foreign company would be good
service in all transitory actions which might be brought against the company
in this state. The court further held that the amendment, that the superintendent can only accept service for the company "so long as it shall have any policies
or liabilities outstanding," is a time limitation on the authority of the superintendent of insurance to act, and not a restriction upon the character of suits.
It was argued that the decision of the Gold Issue Mining Co. case deprived
the insurance company of due process of law, reliance being placed upon Simon
v. Southern Ry.18 and Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough." The contention was rejected both by the Missouri Supreme Court and, on writ of error,
by the United States Supreme Court.1 5 In the first place, in the cases cited by
the insurer, the foreign corporations were not shown to have been doing business in the states in which the suits were brought. (In the Simon case there
was a positive finding that it was not doing business in the state.) In the
second place, the statutes under which service was there had upon the state
officials dealt with foreign corporations which were doing business within
the state without appointing agents for service as other statutes required.'0 A
constitutional limitation that service could be obtained on such an involuntarily
appointed agent only in suits founded upon transactions of the corporation within the state of suit (or more realistically, that jurisdiction might be obtained
without personal service at all only in limited circumstances) is not applicable
to service upon an agent designated by the foreign corporation voluntarily, albeit
such appointment was required as a condition of lawfully doing business within
the state. The distinction serves to emphasize the characterization of this service
as personal rather than constructive.
The next landmark in the construction of this service statute was State ex rel.
American Central Life Ins. Co. v. Landwehr. 7 In this case the insurance company was organized under Indiana laws. The insured was a resident of Kansas,
the beneficary was at all times a resident of Kansas and the policy was issued
in Kansas. The insurance company had designated the superintendent of insurance its agent for service of process, pursuant to the requirements of the
Missouri statute, and service was had on him. The court took the same steps to
construe the statute as were taken in the Gold Issue Mining Co. case, but to a

13. 236 U. S. 115 (1915).
14. 204 U. S. 8 (1907).
15. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243
U. S. 93 (1916).
16. The corresponding Missouri statute is Mo. Rv. STAT. (1929) §
5897. This statute provides for additional service on foreign companies. It,
too, is for illegal business within the state and if applied to suits upon policies
issued in other states, or lawfully issued in this state, it would be void.
17. 318 Mo. 181, 300 S. W. 294 (1927).
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different conclusion. The early statutes of 1845 and 1855 by express language applied only to contracts of insurance made in Missouri, but continued amendments
up to 1879 changed the statute to the ambiguous phraseology that service of
process on the superintendent would "be deemed personal service on the company
so long as it shall have any policies or liabilities outstanding in the state." In
the Gold Issue Mining Co. case it had been said that the amendment providing
that the superintendent could accept service "so long as it [the insurance company] shall have any policies or liabilities outstanding in the state" was a limitation upon the types of causes of action in which such service could be employed.
This point was expressly overruled in the Landwehr case. The court said that the
form of the statute in force at the particular time when this amendment was
added (1869) did not limit its applicability to actions based upon contracts of
insurance made in the state. The court pointed out that this amendment thus
had a different meaning than it would have had had it amended the earlier
statute which by its other provisions was confined to contracts of insurance made
in the state, and consequently the amendment would seem to limit the class of
proceedings as well as the time of service. It is submitted that the court's conclusion is not inevitable. Granting that such a provision, added to a statute already limited to actions based on Missouri contracts, would normally have no
significance beyond limiting the time within which the service would be effective,
it does not follow that in the absence of other stipulations confining such
service to actions on Missouri contracts, that this provision was meant to
have a greater significance, namely, to supply the omission (replacing
what previously had been deleted) as well as furnish a time limitation,
unless you assume the point in controversy, that such limitation is so desirable
that it must have been intended. Because the contract in the principal case
was not made and was not outstanding in Missouri, the court held that no
jurisdiction was acquired by the service on the superintendent of insurance,
overruling Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. and
State ex rel. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Grimm.28
9
In State ex rel. Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Masterson,1
the insurance company
was incorporated in Kansas and the policy involved was issued in Kansas. The
insured was a citizen of Kansas at the time of issuance, but was a citizen of
Missouri at the time of the suit. After the policy of insurance was executed,
the insurance company complied with the law of Missouri regarding service
and was authorized to do business there at the time of the suit. Service on the
superintendent of insurance was held good. The court apparently considered
the status of the parties at the time the suit was brought, and not at the time the
contract of insurance was entered into, as controlling.

The decision in this
case did not extend the service statute to apply to citizens of foreign states,
the court apparently reasoning that since the insured was a citizen at the
time of bringing suit, the policy then being outstanding in Missouri, and as

18.
19.

239 Mo. 135, 143 S. W. 483 (1912).
231 Mo. App. 68, 95 S. W. (2d) 864 (1936).
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the insurance company was licensed to do business in Missouri at the time of
the suit, this could be considered a suit brought by a citizen of Missouri
against a corporation which, at the time of the suit, was considered a resident
of every township of Missouri, and the service was therefore good. This doctrine
was reinforced by the case of Woelfle v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co.,20
where defendant, a Connecticut corporation, issued a policy to the insured in
Illinois. Plaintiff, the beneficiary, was a resident of Illinois when her cause of
action accrued, but moved to Missouri before suit. The company had come under the Missouri service statute and service was on the superintendent of insurance. The court held that plaintiff's right to have service on the superintendent
depended upon whether the policy was outstanding in the state. It further held
that to be "outstanding in Missouri" the policy need not have been vritten in
Missouri, nor need plaintiff have been a citizen thereof at the time of insured's
death. Included within this phrase, it said, were all policies written or liabilities
assumed within or without the state, but which were owned by residents of the
state at the time suit was brought.
However, mere service on the superintendent of insurance was not enough
to give the court jurisdiction over this foreign insurance company where plaintiff failed to allege that the insured or the beneficiary was at the time of suit,
or ever had been, a citizen of Missouri, or that the policy was issued in the
2
state. 1
Then a recent case gave a new interpretation of our statute--State ex rtel.
Phoeniz Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Harris.2 2 Here a Connecticut life insurance
company licensed to do business in Missouri issued a policy of insurance to
the insured in Missouri. Upon insured's becoming disabled, the policy was
assigned to B, a resident of Connecticut, who instituted suit in Missouri by serving the defendant through the superintendent of insurance. The statute provided, "Service of process . . . shall be valid and binding . . . so long
as it [the company] shall have any policies or liabilities outstanding in this
state, although such conpany may have withdrawn, been excluded from or
ceased to do business in this state." The Supreme Court of Missouri held that
this section required (1) that the suit be based on a policy issued or a liability
incurred in Missouri while the company was licensed to do business here, and
(2) that the policy must be outstanding in this state in the sense of being due
here. This case established the rule that for the service to be proper, both of
these factors must be present and the presence of only one would not be sufficient.
This decision maintained the view of the Landwehr and subsequent cases that the
"so long as" clause was one limiting the character of suits to which the statute
applied, but in addition it announced that this clause was not an alternative one
and to this extent seemed to overrule the Masterson and Woelfle cases which

20.
21.
(1937).
22.

112 S. W. (2d) 865 (Mo. App. 1938).
Crabtree v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 341 Mo. 1173, 111 S. W. (2d) 103
121 S. W. (2d) 141 (1938).
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held that "policies outstanding in the state" necessarily included policies written
outside the state but which were owned and held by residents of the state where
suit was instituted. The Phoenix case regarded a policy issued in Missouri as
outstanding in this state, within the meaning of the statute, so long as it remained in force covering a life, person, or property in this state. The fact
that plaintiff-assignee was a non-resident was held immaterial.
Fogle v. Equitable Life Assur. Co.,23 a court of appeals case, presented the
converse situation. This time the policy was issued in Louisiana, payable to
a Louisiana beneficiary. Upon maturity of the policy, the beneficiary assigned
to F of New York and H of Missouri. Suit was brought in Missouri and process served upon the superintendent of insurance. The court held that the
assignment created an obligation in Missouri, and, therefore, it authorized service under Section 5894 of our Revised Statutes.

On rehearing, the doctrine of

the Phoenix case was considered, but despite the assertion of the Supreme
Court in that opinion that the statute was available only when the policy was
issued or liability was incurred in Missouri and the policy or liability was outstanding in Missouri in the sense of being due here, still the Springfield Court
of Appeals insisted that the Phoenix case was not in point, for that was a suit
by non-resident (though on a Missouri contract). It was not believed that the
Supreme Court intended to deprive a Missouri citizen, a bona fide assignee of a
foreign contract, from a remedy in his own state against a foreign insurance
company presently doing business in the state and having other policies outstanding here. The Fogle case was taken to the Missouri Supreme Court by
certiorari24 and it was there declared that the decision of the court of appeals
was in direct conflict with the Phoenix case.

The authority for the doctrine of

that case was then complete.
This statute for service on foreign insurance companies had for years been
a constant sore thumb in litigation in Missouri courts and the numerous reversals and great instability of decisions preveitted attorneys from predicting
with any confidence the outcome of any case, even though the very facts had
previously been litigated. The natural result of such a situation was the repeal
of Section 5894 as it had previously existed and the substitution therefor of the
following statute: "No insurance company . . . not incorporated
. .
under the laws of this state shall . . . issue policies, take risks, or transact
business in this state, until it shall have first executed an irrevocable power of
attorney in writing, appointing . . . the superintendent of insurance of this
state, to . . . receive service of all lawful process, for . .
pany, in any action against said company instituted in any court
this state, and . . . that .
al service upon said company

.

.
.

.

service .
.
Service

.

.
.

.

.
.

the com.
.
of

shall be deemed person.
shall be valid and

binding in all actions brought by residents of this state upon any policy issued
or matured, or upon any liability accrued in this state, or on any policy issued

23.
24.

123 S.W. (2d) 595 (Mo. App. 1938).
136 S. W. (2d) 309 (Mo. 1940).
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in any other state in which such resident is named as beneficiary, and in all
actions brought by non-residents of this state on a cause of action, other than
an action on a policy of insurance, which arises out of business transacted, acts
done, or contracts made in the state. . . . and if any such company shall
an attorney or agent in the manner herein. .
to appoint
fail . .
before described, it shall forfeit the right to do or continue business in this state.
Whenever process shall be served on the superintendent of insurance . . .
such process shall immediately be forwarded . . . to the secretary of the

company

.

.- 25

The legislators, in setting up this statute, apparently realized the vagueness
of the old statute and its susceptibility to various interpretations, and relying
on this knowledge, attempted to omit all previous troublesome phrases and to
recite specifically the suits which might properly be instituted in Missouri
against foreign insurance companies by service upon the superintendent of
insurance, but not with complete success. Previously mentioned cases, if their
fact situations were to once more be presented to the courts of Missouri, with
the courts' decisions to be based upon the new statute, might now be decided
as follows:
1. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. Plaintiff of State A sued defendant of State B in State C (Missouri) on a policy
issued in State D on property there. This case would not fall within the new
statute and the service would be invalid.
2. State ex rel. American Central Life Ins. Co. v. Landwehr. Plaintiff of
State A sues defendant of State B in State C (Missouri) on a policy issued in
State A. This case would not fall within the new statute and the service would
be invalid.
3. State ex rel. Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Masterson. Defendant of State B
issued a policy in State B to plaintiff of State B. Plaintiff then became a
citizen of State C (Missouri) and sues in State C. This falls within the statute
It is also possible
for it seems that the liability accrued in Missouri.
that the service might be validated by the fact that the plaintiff was a Missouri
beneficiary prior to the maturity of the policy, though not at its inception. The
statute is not clear as to the time when the residence of the plaintiff-beneficiary
is to be tested.
4. Woelie v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. Defendant of State A issued a policy in State B. Plaintiff-beneficiary was a citizen of State B when the
cause of action arose, but moved to State C (Missouri) and then brought suit
in State C. It is questionable whether this falls within the statute, for the
policy was neither issued nor matured in Missouri, nor did the liability accrue
in Missouri. It is probable that that provision of the statute validating service
upon the superintendent of insurance in "actions brought by residents of this
state . . . on any policy issued in any other state in which such resident

* 25.

Mo. Laws 1939, p. 451.
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is named as beneficiary" refers only to cases in which the plaintiff was a
resident of Missouri prior to accrual of his cause of action (an hypothesis emphasized by the conspicuous omission of reference to a Missouri assignee of the
beneficiary of a foreign policy) and possibly only to cases in which he was a
resident of Missouri when the policy was issued, but the matter cannot be
deemed free from doubt and a literal reading of the act would validate the
service.
5. State ex rel. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Harris. Defendant of
State B issued a policy in State C to beneficiary of State C (Missouri). Upon
a cause of action accruing, the beneficiary assigned to plaintiff of State B, who
brought suit in State C. This case would fall within the statute and service
would be valid.
6. Fogle v. Equitable Life Assurance Co. Defendant issued a policy in
State A, payable to a beneficiary of State A. Upon the cause of action accruing,
X assigned to plaintiff of State B and plaintiff of State C (Missouri). Suit
was brought in State C. This suit would probably not be allowed under the
new statute. Here there'were two plaintiffs, one a resident of C and the other
a non-resident. Had the suit been brought by plaintiff of B alone, suit would
not have been allowed. Had suit been brought by plaintiff of C alone, suit would
not have been allowed under the literal wording of the statute, for the Missouri
plaintiff was not the beneficiary of a foreign policy but the assignee of the beneficiary. In this respect there seems to be an unreasonable distinction in the new
statute. If, in an action on a foreign policy, such service is valid when the
plaintiff is a Missouri beneficiary, why not also when he is a Missouri bona ide
assignee of the beneficiary (domestic or foreign)? Are there any reasons of
policy for denying him relief in the Missouri courts?
7. State ex rel. Federal Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Wright. Defendant insurance company of State A contracted to sell land in State C (Missouri) to
plaintiff of State C. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract. This would by
express provision fall within the new statute of service if the contract were
made in State C, but not if the contract were made in State A. It should be
noticed that if the contract were made in Missouri, even a non-resident plaintiff
might obtain service under the statute. But the statute does not validate service
at the instance of a non-resident beneficiary of a Missouri insurance policy.
Quaere, what reason of policy supports the distinction?
RALPH J. TucKER

THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

The common law developed to give protection only to the physical person
and to tangible property interests. Later the law expanded so as to protect
all types of proprietory interests. Then the action for defamation was recognized, as it was realized that reputation was such a proprietory interest as
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the law should protect. But the law of libel and slander gave relief only against
defamatory publications; and truth was a defense to any such action.1
As civilization grew more complex and men's relations with one another
grew more impersonal, it was felt that certain aspects of life, other than those
physical or pecuniary, demanded protection. As newspapers became more
sensational and the use of pictures became common, columnists and tabloids
found high salaries and profits in being as venturesome as possible into the
private lives of others. "Thoughts, emotions, and sensations demanded legal
recognition, and the beautiful capacity for growth which characterizes the
common law enabled the judges to afford the requisite protection, without the
interposition of the legislature."2
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone; it is the right of the individual to be free from unwarranted public scrutiny if he so chooses.3
After the courts first recognized the need for the protection of this new
interest, they gave relief based upon the violation of a property right, 4 or on
the ground that the publication would be a violation of a contract, confidence
or trust.5 Up until 1890 the doctrine of the "right of privacy," as such, was
unheard of. In that year there appeared in the HarvardLaw Review an article,
by Brandeis and Warren, which gave birth to the idea that a man had a right,
within certain limitations, to live to himself, and that this right should be
protected as a natural right quite apart from a property or contract right.7
The claim for protection of this interest was first presented to a state court
of last resort in 1896, when the New York Court in Schuyler v. Curtis,8 by
dirtum, recognized that such a right might exist, but said it was a personal right
which did not survive the death of the person injured. The first decision
squarely on the point came in 1902, in the case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,9 when the majority of the court refused to admit the existence of
the right. In this case the defendants, without authority, used the plaintiff's
picture for commercial purposes--in the advertising of flour. The court refused to recognize the right because of two reasons: first, because they found

1. HARPER, ToRTs (1933) § 241.
2. Brandeis and Warren, The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 HARv. L. Ruv.
193, 195.
3. HARPER, op. cit. supra note 1, 277; 21 R. C. L. §§ 1197, 1198; Brandeis
and Warren, supra note 2.
4. Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Mac. & G. 25 (1849) (an injunction granted
to restrain a workman from publishing private etchings which the queen and
prince were having published for themselves on the ground that the property
rights of Prince Albert had been infringed, and that there was a breach of the
trust by the workman in retaining the impressions for himself); Comments
(1908) 18 YAiu L. J. 123, (1910) 20 YALE L. J. 149.
5. Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Ch. 209 (1825) (an injunction granted restraining a pupil from publishing the lectures of a teacher on the ground
that it was a breach of confidence on the part of the pupil who was admitted to
hear them only for his own information); Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch.
D. 345 (1888).
6. Brandeis and Warren, upra note 2.
7. Id. at 205.
8. 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 (1895).
9. 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902).
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no precedent for the protection of such a right; and second, because they
believed the recognition of such a principle would result in a vast amount of
litigation, as there would be no means of limiting the right. These same reasons are often found where a new interest demands recognition. Justice Gray,
in a very vigorous dissent, after pointing out that the lack of precedent was no
valid reason for refusing the relief, said, "Security of person is as necessary as
the security of property;
.
there should be afforded protection, not only
against the scandalous portraiture and display of one's features and person,
but against the display and use thereof for another's commercial purposes .
"1O
As a result of the decision in the Roberson case, the legislature of New York
passed a statute," protecting one against the publication of a picture for commercial purposes, without his consent.
The right of privacy was recognized and protected for the first time in
1905. In that year the Supreme Court of Georgia, in the case of Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co.,12 held that an invasion of a personal right of privacy
was actionable, regardless of the special damages to person, property, or character. This court called the right of privacy a natural right, but failed to indicate just what was meant by the term "natural right". The court relied
heavily upon the dissenting opinion of Justice Gray in the Roberson case.
Since 1905, the courts of California, 13 Kansas,' 4 Kentucky,' 5 Louisiana,'8
1

Missouri, 7 New Jersey,'

s

and North Carolina 19 have recognized the existence of

the right of privacy as a common law right. The Supreme Court of Arkansas,
by dicta, has approved of the doctrine.20 The courts of Rhode Island 2l and
Washington, 22 following the holding of the Roberson case, have declared that

10. Id. at 563, 64 N. E. at 450.
11.

N. Y. CivL RIGHTS LAW (1916)

§§ 50, 51.

12. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905).
13. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); see Metter v.
Los Angeles Examiner, 95 P. (2d) 491 (Cal. App. 1939).
14. Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918).
15. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909);
Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849 (1912); Brents v. Morgan, 221
Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927); Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W.
(2d) 46 (1931); see Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972
(1929).
16. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Schulman v.
Whitaker, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906).
17. Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911) (while admitting the existence of the right of privacy, the court speaks of it as .a property
right rather than a personal right).
18. Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392
(1907); Brex v. Smith, 104 N. J. Eq. 386, 146 At. 34 (1929).
19. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1938).
20. Mabry v. Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 117 S. W. 746 (1909), Tnodified by,
92 Ark. 81, 122 S. W. 115 (1909).
21. Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R. I. 13, 73 AtI. 97 (1909).
22. Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (1911).
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the right does not exist. Virginia 23 is the only state, other than New York, 24 which
has protected the right of privacy by a statutory enactment.
A survey of the cases shows that the question most often arises in cases
involving the publication of pictures for commercial purposes without the consent of the owner. 25 However, there are other situations in which the right of
privacy has been protected. Motion pictures have been held to violate the right.20
In Melvin v. Reid,27 the California court held that a motion picture portraying
the past life of the plaintiff, a former prostitute, who was tried for murder,
acquitted, and after her acquittal "abandoned her life of shame" and became
entirely rehabilitated, was violative of her right of privacy. The placarding
of a debtor has been held to violate the right,28 as has the unwarranted placing
of one's picture in a rogue's gallery.29 Relief has also been given against the

23. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie & Sublett, 1936) § 5782.
24. N. Y. CrvI RIGHTs LAW (1916) §§ 50, 51; D'Altomonte v. New York
Herald Co., 208 N. Y. 596, 102 N. E. 1101 (1913); Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of
America, 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 1108 (1913) ; Middleton v. News Syndicate Co.,
162 Misc. 516, 295 N. Y. Supp. 120 (1937); see Comment (1939) 13 So. CALIF.
L. REV. 81.
25. Corliss v. Walker Co., 64 Fed. 280 (C. C. D. Mass. 1894); Paramount
Pictures, Inc., v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004 (W. D. Okla. 1938);
Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 95 P. (2d) 491 (Cal. App. 1939); Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905); Bazemore v.
Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S. E. 194 (1930), (1931) 31 COL. L. REV.
175, (1931) 29 MICE. L. Rav. 649; Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120
S. W. 364 (1909); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849 (1912); Jones
v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972 (1929); Munden v. Harris,
150 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911); Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich. 372,
80 N. W. 285 (1899); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E.
55 (1938); Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392
(1907); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442
(1902); Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97 (1909); Hillman v.
Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (1911).
26. Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746 (E. D. N. Y. 1936);
Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan.
883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918) (plaintiff's picture being taken without her consent
while she was shopping in a dry goods store, the later exhibition of the picture
in a theater for the purpose of exploiting the publisher's business was held
to be a violation of the right of privacy); Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America,
210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 1108 (1913) (an action against a moving picture company which used the name and pictures of a person as a feature in a film, not
for the purpose of educating those who saw it but only to amuse them, in which
the court held the plaintiff could restrain the defendant's further showing of
the picture and could recover in an action for damages).
27. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
28. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927). The defendant
caused a notice to be placed on a show window fronting a principal street,
stating that "Dr. Morgan [the plaintiff] owes an account here of $49.67 and if
promises would pay an account, this account would have been settled long ago."
The court held this to state a cause of action in tort for invasion of the right of
privacy.
29. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 30 So. 499 (1905); Schulman v.
Whitaker, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906); of. Mabry v. Kettering, 89 Ark. 55,
117 S.W. 746 (1909).
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disclosure of bank accounts, shadowing,31 and wire tapping.32 And in Mau v.
Rio Grande Oil Co., 83 a lower federal court held that one whose name was used
without his consent in a radio broadcast dramatization of a holdup and shooting
of which he was victim may recover damages from the program sponsor and the
broadcasting company for violation of his right of privacy.
As in other instances in the development of the law of torts, as soon as
there are a few cases the courts begin to describe the interest protected according to the types of cases in which protection has been accorded. It has been
suggested 34 that the cases may be grouped into three classes. In the first class,
which covers all unwarranted, unprivileged, and intentional instrusions on the
personal life and affairs of others which cause mental or physical pain, would
be placed such cases as wire tapping, shadowing, and the disclosure of bank
accounts. The second class covers all unwarranted and unprivileged disclosures
of personal thoughts, habits, manners, affairs, appearance, and history of individuals to whom such disclosures occasion emotional disturbances. Typical
examples of this class are the rogue's gallery, and debt placarding cases. The
third class, which includes the bulk of the cases that have come before the
courts, covers the unwarranted, unprivileged, intentional uses of another's
name, likeness, appearance, history, or reputation for the primary purpose of
advancing the user's commercial interest. Into this group falls all of the
cases dealing with the use of pictures for advertising purposes. The only
thing that distinguishes the second class from the third is that in the latter
we find the primary motive is one of financial gain. An attempt has been made
at a somewhat more exhaustive classification by grouping the cases according
to the nature of the injury rather than as to the nature of the wrong. 3 There
would seem to be more merit in this approach; but is this not a type of interest
which should not be straightjacketed into categories so early in its existence?
It crowds future growth. It may be true that newspapers and journals desire
to know the lawful bounds, yet common sense would seem to be a sufficient guide.
The scope of the doctrine of the right of privacy is not without certain limitations. It is somewhat analogous to priviliged communications in the law of
libel and slander. Any person who engages in an occupation which calls for
the approval or patronage of the public is said to submit his life to its exam-

30. Brex v. Smith, 104 N. J. Eq. 386, 146 Atl. 34 (1929).
31. Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis.
537, 139 N. W. 386 (1913), (1913) 26 HARv. L. REV. 658. Plaintiff, who had been
a witness adverse to the defendants in an action pending a motion for a new
trial, was openly shadowed at defendants' instance by detectives. The court
held this was actionable treating it as an action for defamation. This case
could have been better justified as a violation of the right of privacy.
32. Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931). Defendants tapped telephone wires running into the plaintiff's house and transcribed
conversations the plaintiff had over the telephone. The court held this violated
the privacy of those talking over the telephone.
33. 28 F. Supp. 845 (N. D. Cal. 1939).
34. Dickler, The Right of Privacy, A Proposed Redefinition (1936) 70 U.
S. L. R-v. 435; see Comment (1939) 13 So. CALIF. L. REv. 81.
35. Green, The Right of Privacy (1932) 27 ILL. L. REV. 237.
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ination to any extent that may be necessary to determine whether it is desirable to give him the approval or patronage which he seeks.3 6 In the case
of Corliss v. Walker,37 the defendant inserted a print of Corliss 38 in a biographical sketch that was about to be published. The plaintiff sought an injunction
to restrain the defendant. The court held that while a private individual may
enjoin the publication of his portrait, a public character cannot. In Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc.,8 9 the defendant used the names and
pictures of motion picture stars in his business of producing, printing, selling
and distributing accessories for use in advertising and exploiting motion pictures in motion picture theaters. The accessories included the names, drawings, cartoons and caricatures of prominent actors and actre3ses, with the
title of the motion picture in which they appeared. The plaintiff picture company, a producing and distributing company, brought an action for damages
and injunctive relief contending, among other grounds, that the use of the
names and pictures of these stars was an invasion of the stars' right of privacy.
The court held that this was not an invasion of the stars' legally protected right
of privacy in view of the fact that the stars' "faces and names were sold to
the public." However, the statement by the court must be limited to the facts
and the issue here under discussion. The use by the defendant in this particular form of advertising was within the scope of the surrender by the motion
picture star of her privacy. It may have invaded the property right of the
star and her producer in her name and picture, a special property right dependent upon the peculiar nature of the star's business and protected only
upon principles of unfair competition or appropriation.
The Kentucky court, in Jones v. Herald Post Co.,' 0 a case involving the publication of pictures and a story of a woman who fought with two bandits while
they were killing her husband, after admitting the existence of the right of privacy, said: "There are times, however, when one, whether willingly or not,
becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest. When this takes
place, he emerges from hs seclusion, and it is not an invasion of his right of
privacy to publish his photograph with an account of such occurrence.""2.
A right of action for the violation of the right of privacy is purely personal,

36. Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746 (E. D. N. Y. 1936)
(the court held that no cause of action was created in favor of a number of
corpulent women shown in a newsreel attempting to reduce with the aid of
novel apparatus, since the newsreel involved "public interest"). In Metter v.
Los Angeles Examiner, 95 P. (2d) 491 (Cal. App. 1939), the wife of plaintiff had
committed suicide by jumping from the twelfth floor of an office building. Defendant published a picture of deceased together with a news story of the incident. The court held that the right of privacy did not prevent publication of
anything that was of public interest. See also, Brandeis and Warren, supra note
2.
37. 64 Fed. 280 (C. C. D. Mass. 1894).
38. Corliss was one of the early American inventors.
39. 24 F. Supp. 1004 (W. D. Okla. 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 106 F.
(2d) 229 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939).
40. 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972 (1929).
41. Id. at 228, 18 S. W. (2d) at 973.
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and one cannot recover for the violation of the right of a relative, whose right
does not survive but dies with the person. 42 This limitation was laid down even
before the doctrine was accepted by any court. Schuyler v. Curtis, the New
York case which came up six years before the Roberson case, involved a situation whereby certain persons attempted to erect a statute of a woman, no long-.
er living, and one of her relatives commenced an action to restrain it, alleging
the feelings of the relatives of the deceased would be injured. The court held
that it was a personal right which did not pass to the relatives. Three years
later, in 1899, the Michigan court, in Atkinson v. Doherty43 held that a widow
could not restrain the use of the name and likeness of her deceased husband as
a label for a brand of cigars, as the right of privacy, if it existed, was a purely
personal right.
An interesting question arises as to whether a child of tender years has
a legally protectable right of privacy. A Missouri court, in Munden v. Harris,4"
held that a child of five years had an action for violation of his right of privacy.
In that case the defendant jewelry company published the child's picture in connection with an advertisement. It would seem that the court pushed the doctrine to an extreme in this particular case, as a child of that age is generally
recognized to be insensitive to social criticism. 4 5 A year later a lower federal
court, sitting in Missouri, held that a corporation can have no true right of
8
privacy, as that right is limited to natural persons.'
The exact theory of the interest to be protected has confused the courts a
great deal. Courts of equity have usually insisted upon some semblance of a
property interest, but have managed to find it in an artificial way. In some
instances equitable relief has been given by the court without apparent recognition of the problem. The use of the term "natural right" is not very elucidating, and the contract or trust doctrine is only applicable to certain cases.
Early courts, when faced with the problem, looked for some existing analogous
theory, and by the use of a legal fiction found a property interest. The property interest theory, even when stretched far beyond any orthodox concept of
the term, will answer only those cases involving the use of names and pictures, but can never be manipulated to cover the cases dealing with wire tapping, shadowing, and the disclosure of bank accounts. Sounder reasoning would
result if the courts recognized, as many do, that they are now protecting a new
interest in personality instead of giving continued lip service to a doctrine laid
down only to be evaded.

42. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 95 P. (2d) 491 (Cal. App. 1939);
Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis,
147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 (1896); cf. Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga.
257, 155 S. E. 194 (1930) ; Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849 (1912).
43. 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285 (1899).
44. 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911).
45. Dickler, The Right of Privacy,A Proposed Redefinition (1936) 70 U. S.
L. REv. 435, 450.
46. Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982 (W. D. Mo.
1912).
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Forty years have passed since Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., the
first case to give relief against an invasion of the right of privacy. A survey
of the cases, in those jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine, produces no alarming results. The fear of the New York court, in the Roberson case, that a recognition of the doctrine would result in a vast amount of litigation as there
would be no way of limiting the action, now seems to have been unjustified. The
cases which have arisen in those jurisdictions recognizing the existence of a
common law right of privacy have been comparatively few, and the courts, in
most instances, have not applied the doctrine blindly, but have carefully restricted it to a proper ease.
GENE M.

UNTERBEUGER

TESTAmENTARY CHARAcTER OF DEEDs IN MISSOURI

An owner of property has the power to transfer his property by deed or by
will. The principal advantage of a will lies in the fact that it remains ambulatory
and may be revoked as and when the testator desires; also the terms of a will
are the testator's secret. The disadvantages of a will are numerous; it must be
executed in the exact manner prescribed by statute; delay, expense and frequently
litigation are involved in probate; and property passing under a will is subject
to the expense and delay of administration.
A deed avoids the necessity for probate and administration and hence the
accompanying delay and expense. It is easier to prepare and there is less chance
for litigation over capacity of the grantor, proper execution, etc. But a deed
also has its disadvantages. It is not revocable, unless made so by its terms, and
if this is done it may be held testamentary in character and hence invalid as a
deed.
The practical problem is to determine what provisions are valid in a deed
although they result in retention of enjoyment and control by the grantor,1 and
on the other hand, what provisions will make the instrument testamentary and
thus invalid as a deed. An instrument cannot be declared testamentary merely
because its purpose was to avoid the statutes regulating the formation, execution
and probate of a will. It can be declared testamentary only if it is in substance
2
a will.
The fundamental difference between a will and a deed is in the fact that the
will remains ambulatory, and thus may be destroyed or changed at will, whereas
a deed transfers or creates in the grantee a present possessory interest, or the

1. Transfer of title may also be suspended by the delivery of a deed to a
depository. McCleary, Some Problems Involved in ConditionalDeliveries of Deeds
(1931) 43 U. oF Mo. BuLL. L. SER. 5; Tiffany, Conditional Delivery of Deeds
(1914) 14 Coi. L. REv. 389; Bigelow, Conditional Deliveries of Deeds of Land
(1913) 26 HARV. L. REV.565.
2. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625 (1916); Young v. Payne, 283 Ill. 649,
119 N. E. 612 (1918); Abbott v. Holway, 72 Me. 298 (1881).
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present right to future possession, the so-called future interest. The test of a
deed is often stated to be whether "it is to take effect in presenti or after the
death of the maker."' This test includes the creation of a present interest, but it
may be capable of being misconstrued so as to exclude a present right to a future
interest. The crucial matter in many of the cases is whether the provisions in the
instrument give a present right to a future interest, or pass no interest at all
until the death of the grantor. "There are few questions less clearly defined in
the books 'than an intelligible, uniform test by which to determine' when an
instrument conveys a present interest in real estate and when it is testamentary
in character." 4 A general idea may be gained by the reading of many cases, but
even then the results in various jurisdictions are far from agreement. 5
At early common law, inter vivos conveyances of freehold estates were usually
made by livery of seisin which had to be a present effective act. Hence, unless
there was a conveyance to uses, it was impossible to create an estate to commence
in futuro unless supported by a particular estate of freehold. 6 Today, in most, if
not all states, an estate can be created to commence in futuro without conveying
to uses. 7 Where a deed purports to give land at grantor's death, many courts
say that the grantor has a reserved life estate and that the grantee has a vested
remainder.8
Following this analysis the grantor is not permitted to commit
waste and his widow has no dower. Another view is that the grantor has a defeasible fee and that the grantee has a springing executory interest.9 Following
this analysis, the grantor is not liable for ordinary waste' 0 and his widow may be
entitled to dower."
12
of estates.

The latter view is more in accord with the orthodox concepts

There is considerable conflict as to the character of a deed containing the
provision, "this deed shall not take effect until the death of" the grantor. If the

3. Murphy v. Gabbert, 166 Mo. 596, 66 S. W. 536 (1902).
4. Goins v. Melton, 343 Mo. 413, 121 S. W. (2d) 821 (1938), commented on
in (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 419.
5. Ibid. But see Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570,
140 Pac. 242 (1914).
6. Eckhardt, Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1938
(Property) (1939) 4 Mo.L. REV.419, 420; KAlxs, FUTU n INTERETS (1905) § 68.
7. Mo. Ray. STAT. (1929) § 3112, ". . . hereafter an estate of freehold
or of inheritance may be made to commence in future by deed, in like manner
as by will." Buxton v. Kroeger, 219 Mo. 224, 117 S. W. 1147 (1909); O'Day v.
Meadows, 194 Mo. 588, 92 S. W. 637 (1906); Christ v. Kuehne, 172 Mo. 118, 72
S. W. 537 (1903).
8. Dozier v. Toalson, 180 Mo. 546, 79 S. W. 420 (1904); Priest v. McFarland, 262 Mo. 229, 171 S. W. 62 (1914); McAlister v. Pritchard, 287 Mo.
494, 230 S. W. 66 (1921). In the Pritchard case there was a typical warranty
deed in every respect, then: "The above to remain the property of C. M. Pritchard
during the term of his natural life." The court said the grantor must have intended to make a present conveyance of the land, reserving a life estate. Otherwise the deed and the limitation could not stand together. The court overlooked
the possibility of saying the grantor had a fee, and the grantee had a future
executory interest. Notes (1921) 11 A. L. R. 51, (1932) 76 A. L. R. 643.
9. KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1905) c. 4.
10. Abbott v. Holway, 72 Me. 298 (1881).
11. Buckworth v. Tlhirkell, 1 Coll. Juris. 322, 4 Dougl. 323 (K. B. 1785), 3
Bos. & Pul. 652 n.
12. KALEs, FuTuRE INTERESTS (1905) §§ 158b and 159.
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phrase is given a literal construction, as the Missouri courts give it, then clearly
the instrument will be said to pass no present. interest to the grantee, and will
be declared testamentary in character.' 8 There is something to be said for this
view because the "language is suggestive of the ambulatory concept of a will and
in it may lurk the idea that it is revocable by the maker."'14 However, most courts
seem to give the words the more liberal construction of granting a fee to the
grantee, subject to a life estate in the grantor.' 5
When the provision is: "this deed not to take effect in its full entirety-or
absolutely-until after the death of" the grantors, Missouri is in accord with the
majority of courts in construing it to merely reserve a right of possession in the
grantors until after their death.' 6
The following provisions included in the form of a regular warranty deed
are also said not to prevent the present passing of an interest: an estate "to
commence at the death of" the grantor;' 7 the grantor "reserves rents and profits
for life;' 18s "during his lifetime retains possession and control;1 19 grantor reserves rents, profits, possession and control; 20 grantee "is not to come in possession

13. Thorp v. Daniel, 339 Mo. 763, 99 S. W. (2d) 42 (1936). In this case
there was a warranty deed followed by these conditions: (1) "Reserving however
to the (grantor) a life interest in the above described land." (2) "It being
the intention that this deed shall not take effect till the death of the (grantor)."
The court said that (1) standing alone would have created a life estate in
the grantor, with a present remainder in the grantee: "But the last sentence is
very clear and positive that the grantor intended to retain all title in herself."
But is it? Can not the two conditions be construed to be consistent by the same
process of reasoning as was used in McAlister v. Pritchard 287 Mo. 494, 230
S. W. 66 (1921), cited supra note 8? Accord: Murphy v. Gabbert, 166 Mo. 596,
66 S. W. 536 (1902); Terry v. Glover, 235 Mo. 544, 139 S. W. 337 (1911);
Goodale v. Evans, 263 Mo. 219, 172 S. W. 370 (1914); Kanan v. Hogan, 307
Mo. 269, 270 S. W. 646 (1925) (here the deed was reformed to create a life
estate and pass a present interest to the grantee); Turner v. Scott, 51 Pa. 126
(1866); Sperber v. Balster, 66 Ga. 317 (1881); Bigley v. Souvey, 45 Mich. 370,
8 N. W. 98 (1881); Shaull v. Shaull 160 N W. 36 (Iowa 1916); Cohn v. Klein,
209 Cal. 421, 287 Pac. 459 (1930). 6ontra: Glover v. Webb, 205 Ala. 551, 88 So.
675 (1921); Reynolds v. Balding, 183 Ark. 397, 36 S.W. (2d) 402 (1931); White
v. Smith, 338 IIl. 23, 169 N. E. 817 (1930); Nalley v. First National Bank, 135
Ore. 409, 293 Pac. 721 (1931).
14. ATKINSON, WIIs (1937) § 63, p. 145.
15. White v. Smith, 338 Ill.
23, 169 N. E. 817 (1930); Shaull v. Shaull, 182
Iowa 770, 166 N. W. 301 (1918); Nalley v. First National Bank, 135 Ore. 409,
293 Pac. 721 (1931); Cox v. Reed, 113 Miss. 488, 7.4 So. 330 (1917); Trumbauer
v. Rust, 36 S. D. 301, 154 N. W. 801 (1915).
16. Priest v. McFarland. 262 Mo. 229, 171 S W. 62 (1914); Dawson v.
Taylor, 214 S.W. 852 (Mo. 1919); Sutton v. Sutton, 141 Ark. 93, 216 S.W. 1052
(1919); White v. Willard, 232 Ill. 464, 83 N. E. 954 (1908); Timmons v. Timmons,
49 Ind. App. 21, 96 N. E. 622 (1911); Donnelly v. Eastes, 94 Wis. 390, 69 N. W.
157 (1896).
17. O'Day v. Meadows, 194 Mo. 588, 92 S.W. 637 (1906); Josey v. Johnston,
197 Ala. 482, 73 So. 27 (1916); Gay v. Gay, 108 Ga. 739, 32 S. E. 846 (1898);
Noble v. Fickes, 230 Ill. 594, 82 N. E. 950 (1907); Lewis v. Curnutt, 130 Iowa
423, 106 N. W. 914 (1906). Contra: Hester v. Young, 2 Ga. 31 (1847).
18. Dozier v. Toalson, 180 Mo. 546, 79 S.W. 420 (1904) ; Knowlson v. Fleming, 165 Pa. 10, 30 At. 519 (1894); McIntyre v. McIntyre's Estate, 156 Mich.
240, 120 N. W. 587 (1909). Contra: Jones v. Loveless, 99 Ind. 317 (1884).
19. Christ v. Kuehne, 172 Mo. 118, 72 S. W. 537 (1903); Hudspeth v.
Grumke, 214 S. W. 865 (Mo. 1919); Ekblaw v. Nelson, 124 Minn. 335, 144 N. W.
1094 (1914). Contra: Crain v.Crain, 21 Tex. 790 (1858).
20. Hudspeth v. Grumke, 214 S.W. 865 (Mo. 1919); Vessey v. Dwyer, 116
Minn. 245, 133 N. W. 613 (1911).
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.
not to exert any control over the same until after the death" of the
grantors; 2 1 grantors "shall have all controlling power of premises during their
lifetime, and then at their death title is to pass to" grantees. 22 In all of these
situations Missouri is in accord with the majority of the courts.
Where the instrument is in the form of a deed granting all that the maker
"may die possessed of," the courts are in disagreement.23 Most of the courts hold
that this provision renders the instrument testamentary in character. A typical
opinion says: "nothing the grantor owned at the time the deed was made passed
under the deed. The property that he then had remained his, and subject to his
disposition, just as it was before. The operation of the deed is wholly contingent
upon his having the property at his death."24 There is much to be said for this
view. The expressed intention of the maker of the instrument should be controlling, and such language does not indicate that the grantor thought he was
passing a present interest. This is the usual basis of the cases holding such an
25
instrument testamentary in character.
28
In Aldridge v. Aldridge, the instrument, otherwise in the form of a deed,
contained the following provision: ".
.
on this condition however, that if I,
S..
outlive the (grantee) the land reverts back to me in fee. That if I
should die first then the (grantee) shall have the land. . . ." This condition
of survivorship was said to render the instrument testamentary in character. It
is submitted that a deed conveying an interest made to commence in futuro upon
the condition that A is elected President in November would be held to pass a
present interest in a future estate, since the election of the President is a condition
out of the control of the grantor. 27 The survivorship of the grantee is also a
condition outside the control of the grantor. He has passed a present interest
to the grantee, and the possibility of that interest reverting to him is based
on a condition over which he has no authority. Upon this theory many courts
have held that provisions similar to that in the Aldridge case do not invalidate
28
the instrument as a deed.

21. Owen v. Trail, 302 Mo. 292, 258 S. W. 699 (1924) ; Craven v. Winter, 38
Iowa 471 (1874); Beebe v. McKenzie, 19 Ore. 296, 24 Pac. 236 (1890).
22. Wimpey v. Ledford, 177 S. W. 302 (Mo. 1915); Venters v. Wickens, 224
Ill. 569, 79 N. E. 946 (1906); Hitchcock v. Simpkins, 99 Mich. 198, 58 N. W. 47
(1894); Dick v. Miller, 150 N. C. 63, 63 S. E. 176 (1908).
23. For cases holding such an instrument a valid deed see: Goff v. Davenport,
96 Ga. 423, 23 S. E. 395 (1895); Ricker v. Brown, 183 Mass. 424, 67 N. E. 353
(1903). Contra: Brewer v. Baxter, 41 Ga. 212 (1870); Roth v. Michalis, 125 Ill.
325, 17 N. E. 809 (1888); Poore v. Poore, 55 Kan. 687, 41 Pac. 973 (1895);
In re Lautenshlager, 80 Mich. 285, 45 N. W. 147 (1890); Niccolls v. Niccolls,
168 Cal. 444, 143 Pac. 712 (1914).
24. Ison v. Halcomb, 136 Ky. 523, 124 S. W. 813 (1910).
25. See note 23, supra.
26. 202 Mo. 565, 101 S. W. 42 (1907).
27. White v. Hopkins, 80 Ga. 154, 4 S. E. 863 (1887); Owen v. Smith, 91
Ga. 564, 18 S. E. 527 (1892) ; LEAxE, LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND (2d ed. 1909) 88.
28. Bowler v. Bowler, 176 ll. 541, 52 N. E. 437 (1898); Brady v. Fuller, 78
Kan. 448, 96 Pac. 854 (1908); West v. West, 155 Mass. 317, 29 N. E. 582 (1892);
Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich. 338, 43 N. W. 984 (1889) ; Thomas v. Williams, 105
Minn. 88, 117 N. W. 155 (1908). Contra: Chaplin v. Chaplin, 105 Kan. 481, 184
Pac. 984 (1919); Pelley's Adm'r v. Earles, 107 Ky. 640, 55 S. W. 550 (1900).
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When the grantor, after creating an instrument in the form of a deed, expressly reserves the power to revoke the attempted deed most courts hold such an
instrument ambulatory and hence invalid as a deed. 29 In Goins v. Melton,30 the
court held that a reservation of the power "to sell and deed" the land was
equivalent to a reservation of the power to revoke. But could the grantor revoke?
By reserving the power to "sell and deed" he has reserved only the right to make
an inter vivos conveyance for valuable consideration. He has given up the right
to convey the land as a gift inter vivos, or as a gift testamentary. "Thus, the
grantor had very limited powers of revocation, and the grantee had a much
more durable interest then she would have had in a mere expectancy under a
will. It is submitted that the court might well have reached a contrary decision
if the case had been adequately analyzed."It is said, in sustaining the decision in the Goins case, that although theoretically the grantor may have presently given an interest to the grantee, still when
the grantor reserves a life estate and the complete power to revoke the deed, the
grantee has actually gained nothing. But theoretically if a present interest passes
to the grantee-the grantor divested to some extent of his title, at least to the
extent of creating a liabiliy of having it drawn out of him without further act on
his part-there would seem to be little more reason for holding that such a provision renders a deed testamentary than there is in the case of a trust.
In the case of a trust "where by its terms an interest passes to the beneficiary
during the life time of the settlor, the trust is not testamentary merely because
the settlor reserves a beneficial life estate or because he reserves in addition a
power to revoke the trust in whole or in part and a power to modify the trust."3 In fact "courts of equity have always looked with suspicion upon voluntary trusts
or settlements which do not reserve a power of revocation. ' 33 Wherein lies the
mysterious factor that renders one instrument testamentary in character and
permits the other to be a valid inter vivos trust?

29. Butler v. Sherwood, 114 Misc. 483, 186 N. Y. Supp. 712 (1921), aff'd,
233 N. Y. 655, 135 N. E. 957 (1922).
30. 343 Mo. 413, 121 S. W. (2d) 821 (1938). The instrument was in the general form of a warranty deed with the following provision: "It is the express
understanding . . . that the grantor herein shall retain the possession and
control of all profits therefrom for and during his natural life time, . . .
at his death the title to all, or whatever part thereof remains unsold, to pass and
vest in the grantee. . . ." The court said that the power of revocation was
inconsistent with the passing of a present interest, and declared the instrument
testamentary in character. But see Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home,
167 Cal. 570, 140 Pac. 242 (1914), commented on in (1915) 3 CALnF. L. Rnv. 256
in which the grantor reserved the exclusive possession and right of income, and
the right to sell any of the property. Here the instrument was said to convey
"1a present interest in the remainder, upon contingency that the grantor should
not, during her lifetime, convey to another or revoke the deed. . . . The contingencies did not happen; hence the estate is now absolute." In accord are Smith
v. Smith, 167 Ga. 368, 145 S. E. 661 (1928); Blanchard v. Morey, 56 Vt. 170
(1883), saying that the above reservations are not inconsistent with a good grant
in presenti, retaining a life estate and the power to revoke in the grantor.
31. Eckhardt, Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1938
(Property). (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 419, 420.
32. RESTAT;MBN, TRUST (1935) § 57; Scott, Trusts and the Statute of
Wills (1930) 43 HARV. L. Ry. 521, 526.
33. Sims v. Brown, 252 Mo. 58, 158 S. W. 624 (1913).
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In Sims v. Brown,34 the court said: "the words 'I hereby give, grant and
relinquish' indicate an intention to pass a present interest." And "the only
other words which would have any tendency to overcome the meaning and intent
of the above words are the following: The grantor requests that the trustees 'at
any time after my decease shall select and sell 80 acres of the land' said sum
to be held for the benefit of the daughters and her bodily heirs. The phrase 'at
any time after my decease' when fairly construed means nothing more than postponement of the time when the trustee is to take possession of the land for the
purposes of the trust. The fact that the enjoyment of the estate is postponed
to a future date does not change the instrument, otherwise a deed, to an instrument
testamentary in character." 35 But cannot exactly the same reasoning be applied to the facts as they existed in Goins v. Melton? In both cases there
was (1) the granting of an interest to become one of possession on the death of
the grantor, and (2) a reservation in the grantor of the power to sell the land,
which was held to be equivalent to the power to revoke the grant. The fact that
in the Sims case the possession was to go to a trustee should make no difference.
In neither case was there a present conveyance, only a grant of a present right
to a future interest. It is difficult to see why it should be of importance that the
enjoyment of the estate "at a future date" is to go to a grantee who is to hold
for another, rather than for himself.
It is often said that, in the case of a trust, legal title to the future interest has
passed to the trustee. The settlor has at least given up this much, although he
has reserved a life estate and the power to revoke. Then in the case of a deed
legal title to the remainder is said not to pass because the grantorhas reserved the
power to revoke. And since no present interest, or right to a future interest has
been created, the instrument is testamentary in its nature. It is difficult to follow
this distinction. The crux of the entire matter is whether a present right to a
future interest has been created. And when it is assumed that because of the
reservation of the power to revoke no present right to a future interest was
created by the deed the answer has already been assumed. Such an assumption
is not made in the case of a trust reserving a life estate and the power to revoke.
In the Goins case the court casually makes the assumption by saying: "The trust
feature of the Sims case, we think, clearly distinguishes it from the present case."
Just why this distinction is made is not clear; nor is any reason mentioned in
the opinion.
There is no reason why a deed should not be used to avoid the delay, expense,
and frequent litigation involved in the probate and administration of a will.
However, the Missouri courts seem somewhat illiberal in their interpretation of
instruments as deeds. 36 The reason for this attitude is not expressed in the cases

34. 252 Mo. 58, 158 S.W. 624 (1913).
35. It is not absolutely clear when this trust was to commence. However
the court seemed to treat it as if it were to commence only at the death of the
settlor. Such treatment seems logical since there was no reason to have a trust
until that time. That is, the trustee had no duties until the death of the settlor.
36. See notes 13, 15, 26, 28, and 30, supra.
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and we can only offer possible explanations. It may be that the courts question
the wisdom and safety of disposition after death by means of a deed, and want
the grantor to be able to change the disposition of his property in the light of
changing conditions. Or this may be the result or holdover of the common law rule
that no estate could be conveyed in futuro. It is submitted that the courts should
strive to uphold the instrument and declare it valid, and not be over zealous in
declaring an instrument testamentary in its nature.37 The more liberal result is
technically sound, and it is socially desirable as an inexpensive and effective means
of transferring property.
JABS H. OT'MAN

37.

McAlister v. Pritchard, 287 Mo. 494, 280 S. W. 66 (1921).
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